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ABSTRACT
This article provides an introductory analytical survey of macroeconomic policies and 
outcomes in seven Southeast Asian economies, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, The 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. It draws on the framework proposed by 
Corden (1996) to explain the generally good macroeconomic outcomes in the earlier 
World Bank study of the East Asian ‘miracle economies’. The main conclusion is that, 
notwithstanding the institutional and economic diversity of the seven, macroeconomic 
outcomes have generally been good. However, there are some notable exceptions to 
this generalization, and the unfinished reform agenda is substantial in some countries
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INTRODUCTION
Max Corden (1996) provided a comprehensive analytical framework for 
understanding and explaining the generally effective macroeconomic 
management in seven East Asian economies through to the early 1990s. 
Commencing with the observation that inflation rates in most of these 
economies were relatively low most of the time, he characterized the policy 
stance as one of ‘pragmatic orthodoxy’, drawing attention to policy makers’ 
aversion to inflation, grounded on prudent fiscal policy, and also to their 
capacity to respond quickly to potential crises caused by external shocks. The 
focus of his paper was the seven East Asian ‘miracle economies’ that were 
the subject of the World Bank’s 1993 volume, namely (South) Korea, Taiwan, 
Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand.
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This article revisits the subject with reference to seven Southeast Asian 
economies, and employs a similar framework and methodological approach. 
The countries are Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand and Vietnam. Four of these were in the original ‘Miracle’ study, and 
have continued to grow quite strongly in the two decades since the Corden 
study, except briefly during the Asian financial crisis. Two of the additions, 
Cambodia and Vietnam, would now be on the verge of qualifying for inclusion 
into the high-growth club. The Philippines has maintained positive growth 
throughout the period, albeit at a slower rate. It is included in the study 
primarily because its major macroeconomic reforms in the early 1990s have 
delivered consistently low inflation, thus constituting a decisive break with its 
earlier macroeconomic history.
Two major economic events have occurred since the Corden paper. One 
is the Asian financial crisis of 1997-99, which resulted in a sharp but brief 
contraction in economic activity, and which prompted a major rethink of 
macroeconomic policy tools and instruments. The second is the ongoing global 
economic recession since 2008 which, while originating outside the region, 
had a major effect on the region’s growth dynamics as well as prompting 
renewed interest in regional and global macroeconomic coordination, including 
specifically the issue of regional financial safety nets.
The scope of this subject matter is very large, well beyond the scope of one 
short article. Our intention is to sketch, by way of a bibliographic essay, an 
analytical framework to be employed as part of a larger ongoing study of 
macroeconomic management in Southeast Asia. Consistent with the theme 
of pragmatic orthodoxy, we highlight the diversity of policy mixes and 
institutional capacities. For example, Singapore, with its highly open economy 
and well-developed institutional capacity, continues to employ the exchange 
rate as its principal inflation policy tool. Indonesia and the Philippines, 
with histories of higher inflation and weaker institutional capacities, have 
opted quite successfully for independent central banks that do not have to 
accommodate fiscal deficits. The two small Indochina economies, Cambodia 
and Laos, have limited scope for monetary policy owing to high levels of 
dollarization, reluctantly accepting the proposition that this serves as their 
effective monetary policy anchor. Vietnam also has quite high levels of foreign 
currency in circulation, in the context of a central bank that remains very much 
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an arm of the central government. Brunei and Timor Leste have opted to forego 
US dollar respectively as their currency.1
We focus initially on inflation outcomes, asking the question, to what extent 
the countries have achieved low and stable inflation (section 2). Section 3 
then investigates fiscal policy, specifically budget balances and public debt 
management. In section 4 we examine the other key building block of stable 
macroeconomic management, monetary and exchange rate policy, and the 
performance of central banks. Section 5 sums up.
Owing to space limitations and the need to establish an analytical framework, 
the article aims for breadth more than depth. We also eschew a range of 
additional factors that are relevant to macroeconomic policy. One is the quality 
of financial market supervision. Crises often have their origins in this sector 
and, since the resolution of financial crises frequently requires government 
bailouts, apparently conservative fiscal policy may suddenly be derailed by the 
large-scale socialization of these private debts.2 Another factor is the changing 
institutional context in which macroeconomic policy is conducted, including 
notably the increased autonomy of central banks, the reduced flexibility 
of labour market policy, and the scope for greater regional monetary policy 
cooperation. There is also the issue of country reputation and credibility, 
including the ability to assure financial markets that public finances are on a 
sound footing.
This is also not the place to examine the broader issue of the relationship 
between macroeconomic management and economic growth. The general 
presumption in the literature is that there is a positive relationship, in the sense 
that low and stable inflation is conducive to faster economic growth. However, 
it is likely to be a non-linear relationship, in that inflation becomes a drag on 
growth only above some threshold level, or if there is considerable inflation 
1 The three very small economies, Brunei, Laos and Timor Leste, are not included here. Note 
that the major foreign currency in circulation in Laos is the Thai Baht, and that it is far more 
widely used that the Lao currency, the Kip. We also do not include Myanmar (Burma) in the 
study, owing to the paucity of statistics and information on that country’s macroeconomic 
settings. Until its recent currency unification, it had the distinction of having the world’s 
largest discrepancy between the official and black market exchange rates, in the order of 
250:1, that is 6 Kyat to the US dollar officially, as compared to 1,400-1,500 on the black 
market (Odaka forthcoming).
2 This was the case recently in several European economies, notably Ireland. See the special 
issue of Asian Economic Policy Review, Vol. 7, no. 2 (2012) on fiscal policy, edited by 
Takatoshi Ito, for a broad study of global fiscal policy experiences in recent years.
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volatility.3 Within Southeast Asia, the three strongest-performing economies, 
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, have had the best macroeconomic record, 
but obviously one should not draw strong conclusions from single-variable 
explanations. An additional caveat is that we are not comparing the Southeast 
Asian record with that in other developing regions. Globally, inflation has 
been a less serious problem since around 1990, as compared to earlier periods, 
particularly in Latin America with its history of hyperinflation. In this sense, 
East Asia is no longer the exception that it was for the period in Corden’s 
survey. Arguably also, the criteria for evaluating macroeconomic performance 
have changed, embracing not just inflation outcomes but also maintaining 
economic growth, preventing financial crises, and managing external shocks.
THE INFLATION RECORD
Figure 1 shows annual inflation rates for the Southeast Asian economies 
since 1980. Two major outcomes are evident. First, annual inflation has been 
consistently low, less than 10 per cent, for over 95 per cent of the observations, 
and always for Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. Second, the rare cases of 
double-digit inflation have been quickly contained, with inflation returning 
to less than 10% within a year or two. These achievements are particularly 
noteworthy: not only do they confirm Corden’s conclusion of inflation-aversion 
and prompt responses to occasional inflationary episodes, but they have been 
achieved during one of the most tumultuous periods in global economic 
history, including two major crisis periods, food and commodity price volatility 
and, in several countries, considerable domestic political turbulence.
3 Anne Krueger has argued that ‘Analysts [cannot] assert with any conviction that there is, 
for example, a certain rate of inflation, a particular size of the fiscal deficit, or a specified 
maximum average rate of protection, above which rapid growth is impossible.’ Sala-I-Martin 
(1997) in his growth econometrics survey notes the fact that inflation or fiscal deficits do not 
appear among the fundamental determinants of growth is probably due to the presence of 
some unmeasured non-linearities in the relationship.
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Figure 1
Inflation Rates, 1980-2012
Vietnam
Indonesia
Cambodia
The vertical scale has also been drawn to display the occasional inflationary 
episodes. There are two serious inflation peaks evident, two cases where 
prices rose by about 20 per cent and some further cases of inflation briefly in 
the range 10-20 per cent. First, the high-inflation cases, in excess of 50 per 
cent on an annual basis (and higher still on a quarterly basis), These are the 
Philippines in the mid-1980s and Indonesia in 1998. Both episodes occurred 
in the context of disarray, featuring deep economic and political crises. Long- 
lived authoritarian regimes collapsed, Marcos after twenty years in power, and 
Soeharto after thirty-two years. The economies contracting by over 12 per cent 
in one year (1998) in the case of Indonesia, in two years (1985-1986) in the 
Philippines. Both inflationary periods had their origins in large fiscal deficits 
that were quickly monetized.4  In the case of the Philippines, the deficit was 
primarily the result of the then President Marcos’s desperate attempt to cling 
to power in the forthcoming election through reckless spending in the context 
of slowing economic growth, rising capital flight, mounting political unrest 
4 This analysis draws on Gochoco-Bautista & Canlas 2003 for the Philippines, and several 
“Surveys of Recent Developments” in the Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies for 
Indonesia.
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and the repayment of large debts contracted a decade earlier in a phase of 
aggressive borrowing.5 In the event, the strategy backfired, the inflation spike 
was short-lived, and the monetary authorities were able to quickly control the 
inflation, aided by the economic collapse.
The Indonesian case differs in the sense that the fiscal expansion was directly 
crisis-related. Unlike in the Philippines, pre-crisis fiscal policy had been 
conventionally prudent. However, the capital flight that gathered momentum 
in late 1997 resulted in exchange rate collapse, and in turn a widespread 
banking and corporate collapse. Almost all domestic debtors had no foreign 
currency hedging and few had the automatic insurance of a secure foreign 
currency income flow. Thus they were unable to repay their debts, the Rupiah 
value of which had suddenly risen several hundred per cent. In an attempt to 
secure financial and corporate stability, the government – by then incapacitated 
politically – entered into large-scale and largely ad hoc blanket guarantees, 
which fuelled further capital flight and dramatically increased public debts, 
which were quickly monetized. Here also the inflationary episode was quickly 
brought under control, aided by an anaemic economy. However, consistent with 
its longer-term macroeconomic history, while Indonesia has generally kept 
inflation to single digits, it has struggled to maintain very low inflation, of less 
than 5 per cent.
Over the past decade, Cambodia and Vietnam have experienced episodes of 
moderately high inflation, but in both cases the inflationary pressures have 
been contained, and not allowed to escalate into a more serious monetary 
crises. The origins of these events differed, although there are some common 
explanatory factors linked to the inadequacy of the usual macroeconomic 
policy tools at the disposal of the central banks. Cambodia experienced a brief 
period of hyperinflation around 1990, in the wake of the sudden withdrawal 
of Soviet aid, then equivalent to about 15 per cent of GDP, and a government, 
clinging to power in a protracted civil war, resorting to deficit financing. The 
result was a brief period of triple-digit inflation.6 This was quickly brought 
under control following the Paris peace settlement of 1991, which resulted 
in large-scale foreign aid flows and hence non-inflationary deficit financing. 
The large foreign presence, combined with a lack of trust in monetary policy, 
5 It is worth remembering that these borrowings were sanctioned by the international financial 
institutions as a means of recycling accumulating ‘petro dollars’.
6 See Menon 2008 and references cited therein for a fuller discussion.
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also resulted in high levels of dollarization, as much as 80 per cent of the 
money supply, and this in turn stabilized prices, which increasingly came 
to be denominated in US dollars. Subsequently, Cambodia’s inflation has 
generally been moderate, except for brief double-digit increases in 1998 and 
of heightened domestic political tensions, in which the government briefly 
introduced counter-cyclical fiscal policy responses. In the latter period, high 
food and oil prices exacerbated the problem.
Vietnam has experienced two periods of double-digit inflation in recent years. 
In their comprehensive analysis of the country’s monetary policy, Pham and 
Riedel (2012) place less emphasis on fiscal policy, and rather argue that the 
basic problem is Mundell-Fleming’s ‘impossible trinity’. That is, it is not 
possible for governments to simultaneously maintain a fixed exchange rate, 
an open capital account, and an independent monetary policy, combined in 
Vietnam’s case with an underdeveloped financial sector in which the State 
Bank of Vietnam, the nation’s central bank, has limited scope for pursuing 
open market operations. Thus the government has attempted to maintain a 
peg to the US dollar, through a fixed but adjustable exchange rate. It has also 
opened the capital account, which for several years prior to 2009 resulted in 
very large capital inflows, peaking at the equivalent of about 25 per cent of 
GDP at the time of Vietnam’s accession to the World Trade Organization in
2007. There were also speculative bubbles in the country’s real estate and 
nascent stock exchange. The government has sought to sterilize these large 
inflows, primarily through changes to reserve requirements and compulsory 
transactions with the commercial banks. But the interventions have been 
insufficient to contain inflationary pressures. The resulting volatility in money 
supply, and therefore in interest rates, has created an unstable economic 
policy environment and also impaired the quality of bank loans. Pham and 
Riedel recommend a package of policy reform measures, including financial 
deepening and controls over capital mobility, with the desirable goal of greater 
exchange rate flexibility postponed until the first of these measures is soundly 
established.
FISCAL POLICY
As noted, fiscal policy is central to macroeconomic management, since the 
monetization of fiscal deficits is typically the most important explanation of 
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inflationary episodes. The general Southeast Asian record of fiscal prudence 
over the past quarter century of volatility and crises has therefore been all the 
more commendable.
Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) observe that ‘Debt crises tend to come out of 
the blue, hitting countries whose debt trajectories simply have no room for 
error or unplanned adversity.’ Crises frequently lead to large increases in 
public debt, owing to the effects of automatic stabilizers, and as governments 
resort to deficit financing to expand social safety nets, and as a result 
of the socialization of corporate and banking debt. This is arguably the 
most important macroeconomic impact of the GER in OECD economies. US 
general government debt (federal, state, local) has now surpassed the post-war 
record of 120 per cent of GDP. Japan is more than 200 per cent while several 
other OECD economies are approaching 150 per cent. 7  Moreover, this is in 
peacetime, and low interest rates are restraining debt service costs.
Figure 2
Fiscal Balances, 1990-2011 (% of GDP)
Singapore
Indonesia
Thailand
Philippines
7 See the special issue of the Asian Economic Policy Review, Vol. 7, no. 2 (2012), and also 
Reinhart & Rogoff 2011.
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Figure 2 shows fiscal balances for selected years for the seven Southeast 
Asian economies. Prior to the Asian financial crisis, most countries ran small 
fiscal deficits or surpluses, a reminder that the early IMF policy conditionality 
towards fiscal tightening constituted a general misdiagnosis of policy settings 
in the affected economies. For the reasons mentioned above, budgets swung 
from surplus to deficit in the late 1990s, except for Singapore where its 
extraordinary record of fiscal thrift resulted only in a smaller surplus. Although 
most of the countries have run fiscal deficits since the late 1990s, they have 
been modest for several reasons. First, the tradition of prudent and powerful 
finance ministries somewhat immune from the political pressures that intrude 
into other portfolios has been maintained, and if anything strengthened. 
Second, the establishment of independent central banks that do not have as 
their remit the responsibility to finance a budget deficit has added a layer of 
fiscal policy caution. Third, explicit legislative restrictions on the size of fiscal 
deficits have been introduced or reinforced, most notably in Indonesia and 
Thailand.
As a result, public debt rose in the wake of the Asian financial crisis, but since 
then it has either declined, or been stable relative to GDP (Figure 3).8 That is, 
in the latter case, deficits relative to GDP have been no greater than the rate of 
growth of GDP, resulting in a stable ratio. Some governments ran larger fiscal 
deficits during the peak of the global economic recession in 2008/09, either 
deliberately or as a result of the automatic stabilizers, but these were largely 
one-off injections that did not change the fundamental debt dynamic. Hence 
the medium-term fiscal consolidation challenges for these economies are not 
nearly as serious as in most OECD economies.
Of course, these aggregate figures conceal both considerable country diversity 
and a range of looming fiscal policy challenges. Some countries have been able 
to carry considerable larger debt than others without difficulty. For example, 
Malaysia’s has run persistent fiscal deficits since the late 1990s, and these 
deficits have not been used to finance long-term productive investments 
(Narayanan 2012). Malaysia is able to run consistently larger deficits than for 
example neighbouring Indonesia and the Philippines for at least three reasons. 
First, like Japan, the debt is almost entirely domestic. Therefore it is less likely 
8 The Singapore figure refers to gross public debt. On a net basis for the consolidated public 
sector account (that is, including its large government-linked corporations), it would be a 
net creditor.
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to suddenly exit the country, and it is not subject to a sudden increase caused by 
currency depreciation, on the scale that occurred in 1997/98. Second, and related 
to the first, Malaysia has long been a high-saving nation, in addition to the fact 
that its compulsory national savings scheme, the Employees Provident Fund, has 
provided a pool of quasi-captive domestic resources. Third, the country has a 
long-established reputation for effective monetary policy,  centered on its credible 
central bank, Bank Negara Malaysia.
Figure 3
Central Government Debt (% of GDP)
Singapore
Philippines 
Malaysia
Thailand
Indonesia
 
In most Southeast Asian economies, fiscal policy has been at best mildly counter- 
cyclical and often pro-cyclical. Traditionally, the explanation in developing 
economies has been that, when hit by a crisis, they did not have alternative 
fiscal financing means at their disposal: they could not borrow internationally, 
the domestic bond market is underdeveloped, and printing money would be 
inflationary and would anyway be prohibited by an IMF program if operative. 
Bhanupong (2013), for example, attributes the absence of counter-cyclical fiscal 
policy in Thailand during the past decade to weak institutions and a highly 
politicized environment. As in Indonesia currently, public servants are also 
reluctant to sign off on major infrastructure projects, especially those prepared 
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in haste as part of a crisis-related spending program, for fear that the inevitable 
cutting of corners would subject them to the scrutiny of anti-corruption agencies 
and NGOs.
Governments have also frequently lacked the administrative capacity to quickly 
push up expenditures, especially in much-needed infrastructure, with the result 
that crisis responses have tended to focus on the revenue side, which is less 
effective as tax cuts are more likely to be saved in times of uncertainty. Most 
Southeast Asian governments introduced fiscal stimulus packages in response 
to the global economic recession of 2008/09. These varied in both size and 
composition, with the richer economies Singapore and Malaysia introducing 
larger packages, of 5 per cent of GDP or more, while in the lower-income 
economies the magnitudes were typically 1-2 per cent. The composition of these 
packages also varied. The government in the highly-open economy Singapore 
economy, worried about the import leakage effects of a stimulus, focusing 
inter alia on measures that would encourage firms to retain their workforces 
as a means of limiting the rise in unemployment, in a country where no formal 
support for the unemployed exists. In Thailand and Indonesia, where the stimulus 
magnitudes were much smaller, for political economy reasons the former opted 
mainly for increased expenditures, while the latter resorted mainly to tax cuts 
(Kanit & Basri 2012). The Indonesian stimulus was introduced as a one-off 
measure, and was also constrained by the looming election. The Thai stimulus 
was more open-ended, and is part of a general trend in that country towards 
more populist fiscal and labour market policies (see further Ammar 2011).9 In the 
case of Vietnam, its rapid economic growth was underpinned by liberalization 
and macroeconomic stabilization in the late 1980s. However, public debt began 
to rise rapidly during the 2008/09 global economic crisis, owing to slower 
global growth and a home-grown crisis referred to below. Although the policy 
response has been quite effective, Adams (2012) highlights continuing ongoing 
vulnerabilities related to potential contingent liabilities in the state-owned 
banking sector, to the narrow coverage of the budget, and to exchange rate and 
interest rate sensitivities.
In addition, the medium-term fiscal policy agenda is substantial in many of 
these countries. The revenue effort is often weak. There are low levels of public 
sector efficiency and probity. More cost-effective social safety nets are required, 
9 For example, by mid-2013, the controversial ‘rice pledge’ program is estimated to be costing 
the equivalent of more than 3 per cent of GDP.
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in place of large, poorly targeted subsidies. In particular, the two net energy 
exporters, Indonesia and Malaysia, have wasteful energy subsidies that are 
inequitable and contrary to environmental objectives. The fiscal implications 
of the region’s rapidly ageing populations are yet to be addressed. Large public 
sector projects are often corruption-prone, while state enterprise sector reform is 
slow. Moreover, the facilities for longer-term debt markets for infrastructure are 
underdeveloped. In the latter respect, fiscal policy may actually be too cautious, 
in the sense that there is a case for public sector borrowing for high-return 
infrastructure spending, providing it can be undertaken on purely technical 
grounds, insulated from narrow political interests.
One reform that is gaining currency in the wake of the global economic 
recession  is  the  establishment  of  independent  fiscal advisory  councils, 
to elevate public understanding of the issues, to force governments to 
acknowledge the hidden costs of their guarantees and off-balance sheet costs, 
and to help overcome the very strong deficit bias inherent in the political 
cycle. Several countries are discussing the possibility of independent fiscal 
watchdogs, such as the United States Congressional Budget Office, but these 
typically have limited analytical capacity and they generally accept official 
budget documents at face value. More powerful bodies might be created, with 
an independent charter analogous to that of many central banks. Nevertheless, 
the US budget shutdown of October 2013 serves as a reminder that the creation 
of formal institutional structures is no guarantee of improved fiscal policy.
MONETARY AND EXCHANGE RATE POLICY
This has been the one area of significant policy advance in the region since the 
Asian financial crisis, as emphasized in retrospective studies of this event.10 
Most countries have gradually adopted a regime of independent central banks, 
inflation targeting and greater exchange rate flexibility. That is, there has been 
recognition that ‘fixed but adjustable’ crawling peg regimes do not work in 
the case of large and sometimes volatile capital flows (and terms of trade 
movements), in which private borrowers assume no exchange rate risk.
Exchange rates fell steeply during the Asian crisis as central banks found they 
could no longer defend their fixed rates, but after this sharp adjustment, over 
the past decade, including during the global economic recession, they have 
10 See for example Corden 2007 and Ito 2007.
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generally remained quite stable (Figure 4). Financial markets and corporates 
are becoming more comfortable with flexible exchange rates. This flexibility 
also acts as a discipline on government excesses.
Figure 4
Exchange Rate
(per U.S. Dollar, end of period, based at 1995= 100)
These reforms are consistent with the proposition that economic crises are often 
triggers for major policy reform.11 Elsewhere (Hill 2013) I have argued that the 
reforms in the two most crisis-affected economies, Indonesia after 1997/98 and 
the Philippines after 1985/86, were driven by a constellation of forces. First, 
they were introduced after very deep crises. There was a broad recognition of 
the costs of bad policy, and a predisposition to reform. Second, the reforms 
did not confront any immediate and powerful vested interests. They were not 
controversial, and there was no grand ideological debate over them. In fact, 
especially in the Indonesian case, they were introduced without much fanfare, 
11 In the words of Lal and Myint (1996: 288), in summing up a large comparative project on the 
political economy of reform, ‘[t]urning points [in economic policy] are invariably associated 
with macroeconomic crises.’
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almost ‘reform by stealth’. Third, they had strong backing inside government, 
from key technocrats in the central bank and ministry of finance. Fourth, they 
occurred under the presidency of leaders who were either predisposed to reform 
(Ramos in the Philippines) or inclined to listen to their technocratic advisers.12 
Fifth, the reforms occurred while the countries were under IMF programs, which 
is presumptive evidence that the Fund played a role. But in both countries, 
the Fund’s role was then controversial (and still is in Indonesia), and so it is 
unlikely that the reforms could have been achieved if any of the four factors 
mentioned above were strongly negative. Moreover, Indonesia’s fiscal law was 
introduced precisely because the government wanted to exit the Fund program 
a year ahead of schedule, owing to its unpopularity, and this strengthened the 
hand of President Megawati’s advisers, who urged that some institutionalized 
restraints on fiscal policy needed to be in place prior to the exit.
Within the context of a generalized shift towards greater exchange rate flexibility, 
the experience of the three Indochina transition economies is of particular 
interest.13 The process of dollarization has been the most extensive and persistent 
in Cambodia, which is one of the most heavily dollarized countries in the world. 
High levels of dollarization commenced mainly during the United Nations 
(UNTAC) transitional period of 1991–1993, and in this sense it can be viewed 
as a direct legacy of the destruction of economic and financial institutions after 
the 1970s, economic mismanagement in the 1980s, and the large inflows of US 
dollars in the early 1990s. Recent estimates put the share of foreign currency 
deposits (FCDs) in broad money (M2) to be about 80 per cent.
Quasi-dollarization has costs and benefits. Arguably the main costs are 
the loss in seigniorage and the reduced ability of the monetary authority 
to implement discretionary monetary policy, that is in foregoing access to 
a major macroeconomic policy tool. The monetary authority also loses 
its capacity to act as lender of last resort in order to guarantee the payments 
system in the event of a banking crisis. There is a loss of seigniorage, but 
this is estimated to be small, in range between 0.1 to 0.5 per cent of GDP. 
Nevertheless, the benefits have been substantial. The hyperinflation of the 
early 1990s soon dissipated as the level of dollarization increased exogenously, 
and as noted the country’s inflation rate since then has generally been modest. 
12 The Indonesian reforms occurred during the administrations of Presidents Habibie (central 
bank independence) and Megawati (the fiscal law).
13 The following discussion draws on Menon et al. 2009.
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With dollarization, Cambodia’s nominal exchange rate acts as a nominal 
anchor to manage inflation. In an environment of price and exchange 
rate stability, both trade and growth have increased sharply. This contrasts with 
the recent experience in neighbouring Vietnam, for instance, where declining 
dollarization has been accompanied by significant increases in the volatility of 
prices and exchange rates. There is an understandable ‘nationalist’ frustration 
in government circles over their inability to control monetary policy. But thus 
far, an approach of pragmatic non-interference has generally been maintained. 
Presumably dollarization will decline only when the community’s faith in the 
capacity of the monetary authorities to run prudent monetary policy is restored. 
In this sense, dollarization acts as both a restraint on policy excess and an 
incentive to strengthen policy reform.14
Returning to the general issue of exchange rate flexibility, this regime only 
work of course if the overall policy settings are supportive. For example, many 
observers would judge that the single most important economic policy reform 
in the post-Marcos Philippines has been the establishment of an independent 
and effective central bank, the BSP. Nevertheless, as Desierto and Ducanes 
(2013) also point out, effective monetary policy cannot alone achieve high 
growth. It cannot overcome the problems of occasional deep political impasse 
between the executive and the legislature, of a weak revenue effort starving 
the country of much needed investments in infrastructure, education and health 
services, and of structural rigidities in the goods and factor markets. More 
generally, especially for poorer countries, to the extent that exchange rate 
fluctuations introduce greater food price volatility, in countries where 30-50 per 
cent of the population is clustered very close to the poverty line, cost-effective 
social safety nets are required to protect the poor in the face of large external 
shocks transmitted through the exchange rate.
There continues to be a debate over whether, and how far, capital accounts 
should be opened. The extensive international literature regarding the 
effectiveness of these controls is ambiguous and cautious.15  If they are to 
be implemented, this historical evidence suggests that they are likely to be 
14 Conversely, one might argue that, given the country’s devastating historical traumas and 
small economy – its GDP is about $16 billion – surrounded by its much larger neighbours 
of China, Vietnam and Thailand, it might never make sense to aspire to monetary policy 
independence, as in the case of smaller emerging economies in the Americas, the Pacific 
Islands, and Eastern Europe.
15 See Gochoco-Bautista, Jongwanich & Lee 2012 for some recent Asian evidence.
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more effective when they take the form of market-based mechanisms, such 
as unremunerated reserve requirements, ‘analogue’ measures that can be 
more easily altered to adjust to flows, and they are not ‘over-engineered’ 
and too detailed. Obviously, also, they should not be employed to prop 
up a fundamentally disequilibrium exchange rate, there needs to be a clearly 
communicated exit strategy, and there needs to be a distinction between short 
and long-term capital flows. Moreover, in the context of any globally coordinated 
measures, it is important to focus on the ‘push’ factors, principally the extremely 
loose monetary policy in the rich economies as much as these ‘pull’ factors.
Another lesson from the Asian financial crisis is that such capital account 
opening needs to be accompanied by a reform package centered on effective 
financial supervision. For example, Bhanupong (2013) concludes that, in the 
case of Thailand, ‘The major deviation from the long-term [growth] trend 
can be attributed to the premature liberalization of the capital account.’ As 
noted, Pham and Riedel (2012) caution against Vietnam liberalizing its capital 
account until the country has achieved greater financial depth. However, 
there is a contrary case, from the experience of other countries in the region. 
Indonesia decided to open its capital account relatively early, in 1971, after 
a long and bitter experience with the distortions and rampant corruption 
associated with multiple exchange rates. The Philippines opened its capital 
account in the early 1990s for similar reasons (Gochoco-Bautista & Canlas
2003). Cambodia has such porous borders and high levels of dollarization 
that it would be virtually impossible to attempt to close its capital account. 
Moreover, there is not much evidence that, once capital accounts are opened, 
capital controls can be effectively re-imposed.
One related exchange rate issue in Southeast Asia concerns the availability 
and effectiveness of financial safety nets. These have been actively discussed 
and formally progressed since the Asian financial crisis, owing principally 
to deep dissatisfaction with the IMF intervention in the late 1990s. The first 
step was the creation of the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) in 2000. When the 
CMI proved inadequate in the 2008/09 global economic recession, it was first 
multilateralized (CMIM), and then doubled in size to $240 billion, while the 
IMF de-linked portion was increased to 30 per cent of the available country 
quotas. A surveillance unit, the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office 
(AMRO), was set up in 2011. These are apparently significant developments, 
but have they created a workable institution? Without clear and rapid- 
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response procedures to handle a fast-developing financial emergency, Hill and 
Menon (forthcoming) argue it is unlikely that the CMIM will be used even 
as a complement to the IMF. Moreover, currently it seems even less likely 
that it could be used as a stand-alone option: its size, or the IMF de-linked 
portion of funds, needs to be further increased, as does its membership to add 
diversity. AMRO also needs to be developed into an independent and credible 
surveillance authority before it could reasonably be in a position to lead a 
future rescue.
Faced with this uncertainty, and the continued unpopularity of the IMF, 
governments have mainly resorted to two main options. The first is foreign 
exchange accumulation, which has risen steadily in all countries, both 
absolutely and relative to GDP (Figures 5 and 6). For most countries, this has 
now become the front-line macroeconomic insurance mechanism. But it is a 
costly strategy, as it locks up funds in low (or even negative) return assets, 
most notably US government treasury bills.
Figure 5
 Foreign Exchange Reserves ($ billions)
Singapore
Thailand 
Malaysia 
Indonesia 
Philippines 
Vietnam
Cambodia
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Figure 6
Foreign Exchange Reserves (% GDP)
Singapore
Thailand 
Malaysia 
Cambodia 
Philippines 
Indonesia 
Some central banks have to bear a direct balance sheet cost in holding these 
reserves, to the extent that they offer significantly higher interest rates on 
their security instruments, which are used to sterilize the large capital inflows 
of recent years. Large foreign exchange reserves are also potentially risky, 
to the extent that they may be seen as prima facie evidence of mercantilist 
international commercial policy, in the form of deliberately suppressing the 
exchange rate. For example, since the late 1990s Singapore, Malaysia and 
occasionally Thailand have run current account surpluses which, relative to 
their GDPs, are significantly larger than that of China. It is only their relatively 
small size that has presumably spared them from the threat of United States 
retaliatory action. The second defence strategy has been various bilateral swap 
agreements with larger economies, principally the United States, China and 
Japan. Whatever the merits of these arrangements, they are administratively 
burdensome as they require protracted negotiation renewals, and may not 
necessarily be available when a crisis suddenly emerges.
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CONCLUSION
In rapidly changing global and domestic political circumstances, the major 
Southeast Asian economies have generally maintained the region’s reputation 
for prudent macroeconomic management. With only two brief exceptions, 
inflation has been low, almost always in single digits and often less than 5 per 
cent for the past thirty years. This low inflation has been achieved through 
generally prudent fiscal policy, sometimes enshrined in legislative restraint, 
and competent central banks that are increasingly independent from political 
pressures. Although this is broadly a continuation of the earlier macroeconomic 
record, particularly among the three more advanced economies, governments 
have also learned some major policy lessons from the 1997/98 Asian financial 
crisis. The crisis generally reinforced the bias towards fiscal prudence by 
strengthening finance ministries. Central banks were given greater autonomy, 
and greater exchange rate flexibility has been introduced. Financial sectors 
are now more carefully supervised, thus lessening the macroeconomic risks 
associated with financial crises.
There are a variety of policy approaches and institutional arrangements 
that underpin these outcomes, thus underlining the continuing relevance 
of Corden’s ‘pragmatic orthodoxy’ framework, of policy approaches that 
broadly deliver the desired outcomes in diverse institutional and economic 
contexts. Thus the latecomer Indochina economies have experimented with 
partial dollarization with reasonable success. The Philippines has achieved 
major central bank reform while broader policy reform still lags. Malaysia 
experimented with short-term capital controls in the wake of the Asian 
financial crisis, and its intervention was judged to be a success (Athukorala 
2012). Indonesia has reduced its public debt dramatically, from equivalent to 
about 100 per cent of GDP in 1999 to about 25 per cent currently.
For every success, however, there are new challenges. First, there continue 
to be moderate inflationary episodes, especially in the lower middle-income 
group, and so the inflation dragon has not been exterminated. Second, the 
requisite financial deepening, on which central bank open market operations 
rely, is developing slowly in some countries. Third, one of the region’s 
historical macroeconomic success stories, Thailand, now appears to be 
abandoning its traditional fiscal prudence. Malaysia also may be headed in 
the same direction. Fourth, the partial dollarization measures employed in 
the Indochina economies are at best only temporary strategies. Fifth, foreign 
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reserve accumulation in several economies is arguably excessive, and reflects 
in part the fact that workable and trusted financial safety nets are not in place. 
Sixth, labour markets in several economies have become much more tightly 
regulated, in the process weakening the economic flexibility – and by extension 
the capacity to achieve major real exchange rate depreciations – that has been 
a hallmark of the region. Seventh, although the macro fiscal indicators mostly 
appear impressive, the micro foundations of fiscal policy are much weaker. 
Serious challenges are present, with regard to the efficiency and equity of tax 
and expenditure policies, in addition to the looming contingent liability of 
unfunded national pension schemes in the context of rapidly ageing societies. 
Moreover, these challenges are occurring against an international backdrop 
where the region is no longer such a standout performer in the developing 
world, as Latin American reforms in particular have resulted in that region no 
longer being the macroeconomic outlier that it once was.
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